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Doubting and Believing: The Hermeneutics of 
Suspicion in Contexts of Faith 
C. Jan Swearingen 
R eligious and cultural conservatism currently enjoys much press and some praise. In contrast, many corners of our intellectual and academic worlds 
promote what Stephen Carter ( 1 993) has termed a "culture of disbelief." Current 
practices of teaching writing and interpretation in the academy exemplify this 
culture. Academics in  several fields focus on unmasking hidden and illusory 
meanings, on revealing private personal pathologies and larger cultural wrongs. 
Some literary theorists openly recommend avoiding conviction and propose only 
hesitant, qualified modes of reasoning and writing lest conviction lead to dogma­
tism (Hartman, 1 9 9 1  ) . "The best lack all conviction; while the worst/ Are full of 
passionate intensity" (Yeats, 1 986, p. 9 1  ). 
The current academic "doubting game" (Elbow, 1 986) is sustained by the 
practice of "in terrograting" cultural values and paradigms. The doctrinaire 
quality of this belief system confronts students when they arrive at colleges and 
universities with diverse convictions that-despite their differences from one 
another-differ even more radically from the skepticism that is the required mode 
of thinking, reading,  and writing in many univers ities'  English curricula.  
Because the relationship between the life of the mind and the resources of belief 
has received so little attention in academic and scholarly circles,  and because a 
diversity of cultural values and beliefs about learning are manifest among today's  
college s tudents ,  I propose that  i t  i s  t ime to renew our  attention to the 
relationships among belief and knowledge, skepticism and learning, education 
and obligatory doubt. 
Rightly and wrongly, students reject or are confused by academic pedagogies 
and scholarly goals that focus relentlessly on skepticism and adversarial debate. 
As writers and readers, as teachers of writing and ways of reading, how should 
we expand the repertoire of analytic methods and practices that we employ? How 
can we reintegrate the valuable rigors of the life of the mind with the ability to 
read with the eyes of faith? The renowned Marxist teacher and activist Paolo 
Freire, for example, was also a committed Jesuit missionary. Can we not con­
tinue to applaud his liberatory pedagogy and begin to remember the religious 
convictions that inspired his teaching? Peter Elbow ( 1 986) has defended the "be­
lieving game" alongside and in dialectical relationship with the "doubting game" 
familiar to academicians, as a more comfortable starting point for many student 
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readers and writers. Similarly, Mary Belenky and her colleagues ( 1986) noted 
that a certain loss of faith accompanied the entry into the college classroom cul­
ture of the working class women they studied. Many of the students, upon learn­
ing to reject received and previously unquestioned authority became for a time 
radical skeptics and individualists, "separated learners." In Belenky's account, 
some never recovered from this radical epistemological isolation, from the loss 
of faith which is also a loss of self. 
Blind faith in religious or political doctrines should not be conflated with 
faith in oneself, one's activities, and the formation of a self that ground educa­
tion, writing, and reading for many teachers and students. Can we improve on the 
crude understanding of religious belief and conviction as somehow indelibly 
anti-intellectual that is, itself, too often an unexamined article of faith within the 
academy (Carter, 1993; Holmes, 1993; Wills, 1990)? Can we develop related in­
sights that will help us dismantle the political dogmatisms of the left and the 
right that within and outside the academy increasingly foreclose discussion of 
diverse views, even while claiming to defend diversity? I turn to a investigation 
of how we might begin to answer such questions. 
Lead Us Not into Conclusion: 
The Academy's Paradoxical Faith in Skepticism 
Literary critic Gerald Graff ( 1990) defends "the culture wars" and propounds 
"teaching the conflicts." Others ask whether recent critical theories-the 
hermeneutics of suspicion, deconstruction, and postmodernism-mean that the 
discovery and articulation of truth and meaning is no longer a valid aim of inter­
pretation (Torgovnick, 1993). Should criticism and interpretation, the guiding 
forces behind the teaching of reading and writing, be so singularly devoted to 
questioning all bases of judgment and to a hermeneutics guided by suspicion of 
discovered or constructed meaning, indeed, of concluding anything at all? Con­
cerns about the perils of negative dialectics, aimless deconstruction, and an 
unrestrained emphasis on abstract and analytic thought have been advanced by 
critics from unexpectedly different camps. Feminist scholars, postmodern 
theorists, and multiculturalists have converged on one point. For very different 
reasons they warn that outside of carefully defined purposes-such as criticism 
that is clearly directed at improved understanding-the relentless interrogation 
of received beliefs and the practices of skepticism, debate, and negative dialectic 
can lead scholars and students alike to become "expressionless, pitiless, unteach­
able ... incapable of belief" (Wolf, 1984, p. 136). Like the separated learners 
that Belenky et at. (1986) characterize, such individuals in their radical skepti­
cism can become alienated from the larger communities, including communities 
of belief, in which they might renegotiate themselves and their futures. 
Further compounding the emphasis on doubt rather than on belief, the indi­
vidual rather than the collective, the legacies of Marx and Freud have left us with 
a hermeneutics of suspicion, the habit of interpretive skepticism that questions 
any apparent or received meanings as possibly and even probably illusory. Marxian 
and Freudian theories guide practitioners in cultural studies, where approaches 
to race, class, and gender, alongside deconstructionist readings of texts, assume 
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that the culture, the author, or the reader have something deep to hide. The reader 
in these models of textual interpretation becomes the analyst of a situation that is 
assumed to be pathological from the onset. We have observed how easily such 
readings erode into victim narratives: stories of how an individual character or 
author or ethnic group was oppressed by an elitist culture, sadistic parent, or evil 
overlord. Freudian theories of individual identity and Marxist theories of cul­
tural structure have, since early in  this century, advanced the views that religion 
is delusory and narcotic, that belief is illusory, and that hope is naive. 
These not-so-old hermeneutic habits die hard; the cultures of disbelief still 
outweigh the cultures of belief within the academy. But they are being countered 
in debates about academic personality styles, models of consciousness, ways of 
knowing, and ways of writing. Reappraisals of academic modes have in  turn 
sparked renewed attention to the nature of argumentation, conflict, and contro­
versy-extending the ongoing dialectic between controversy and dialogue within 
philosophy and philosophical hermeneutics (Maranhao, 1986; Swearingen, 1 990). 
By the individualist measure of intellectual rigor, dialogue and reading for un­
derstanding are typically deemed "soft" and epistemologically incorrect. Why? 
Because notions of classroom dialogues and of the reading of literature as dia­
logic assume that there can be authentic exchanges between individuals, that there 
can be edifying discourses (Marino, 1 993). Such models have been repeatedly 
questioned and even scorned in postmodern theory. Nonetheless, as an instru­
ment of classroom learning and discussion, the dialogic paradigm is far more 
comfortable than debate and programmatic skepticism to many students, to many 
women in Western culture (Belenky et a! . ,  1 986), and to many non-Westerners 
(Gates, 1 993; Ong, 1 992; Said, 1 99 1 ). 
As the academy becomes increasingly multicultural and interdisciplinary, it 
is expanding and realigning its repertoire, and diversifying its models of thought, 
identity, ways of thinking, knowing, interpreting, meaning , and writing (Gates, 
1993). Jerome Bruner ( 1 986) observes that the Western educated self is only one 
among many possible "canonical images of selfhood" within as well as outside 
the academy (p. 130). The traditional Western individualist model of self and 
voice contrasts sharply with the social, collective phenomenology of knowledge, 
thought, and composition that many nontraditional students bring with them into 
today's classrooms. Individuals from cultures where learning takes place in groups 
tacitly believe in themselves-and in their learning-partaking in a shared con­
sciousness and pursuing a collectively acquired wisdom. Such learners believe 
themselves to be inheritors of a legacy rather than as forgers of new, original 
revolutionary thinking. These are not simply nontraditional student beliefs and 
practices; they are evidence of intellectual traditions that are entering into today 's 
academy and changing it. Even among the oldest Western traditions can be ob­
served similar beliefs in collective knowledge alongside the more familiar and 
more emphasized paradigms of individual autonomy and analytic thought. 
Socrates' "know thyself'' came to mean "separate yourself from the Other" 
(Kierkegaard, 1 966, p. 202). Socrates' contemporary Epictetus ( 1 962) understood 
the same enjoinder in an irreducibly collective sense: "Bid a singer in the Chorus 
'know thyself' and will he not turn for the knowledge to the others, his fellows 
in the chorus, and to his harmony with them?" (3: 14). 
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Alternatives to individualism and skepticism may be found i n  Western aca­
demic paradigms of Socratic dialogue ( Kierkegaard's portrait of Socrates not­
withstanding) and in hermeneutic practices directed at constructing collabora­
tive meaning. These practices of thought and language have long emphasized 
interactional and collective models of mind, discourse, self, and meaning. How­
ever, these collaborative practices have often held a minority position in  relation 
to the programmatic doubt and to the analytic modes that, since Descartes, have 
dominated the Western academy and its values. 
Despite i ts reputation for spawning culture wars and promoting skeptici sm, 
the current multicultural academic setting can be particularly hospitable to dia­
logue and dialogical hermeneutics, ways of knowing and learning in the academy 
that have long provided alternatives and complements to skepticism, analytic dia­
lectic, and doctrines of linguistic contingency (Gates, 1 992). Truth-building modes 
of discourse have never been entirely absent from academic models; indeed, they 
i l lustrate that b e l ief, and even faith, need not and should not be regarded 
reductively or as e nemies of reason (Carter, 1 993;  Ong, 1991).  Reading with the 
eyes of faith is an activity that secular Romantic aesthetics borrowed from Prot­
estant hermeneutics in the late eighteenth century. The ability to read with, and 
as, is a believing game (Elbow, 1 986) firmly grounded in literary aesthetics such 
as the Romantic poet Coleridge's notion that reading and appreciating poetry re­
quires a willing suspension of disbelief, an edifying suspension of skepticism. 
Dialogue, thus understood, has long functioned as a classroom paradigm without 
diminishing or impeding the merits of skepticism and analysis.  The academy's 
modes of thought and language can and should be  renewed by rehabilitating a 
positive, constructive dialectical relationship between belief and dialogue, on 
the one hand, and the discourses of analysis and debate, on the other. Orchestrat­
ing diverse academic models could lead to intellectual multiculturalism in place 
of culture wars. If the academy's models were realigned to become less hostile to 
the worlds of belief, conviction, and reasoned action where most people spend 
most of their time, we might experience less difficulty, for example, in  apologiz­
ing for or defending academic writing. 
Reading Literature Through the Eyes of Faith 
Writing In Hopes of Becoming 
Literary study is rapidly changing, both as an object of classroom and schol­
arly interpretation, and as a repertoire of models for classroom and scholarly 
discourses. How we teach reading and how we teach writing are firmly linked in  
this  movement. As li terary, social, and cultural studies mingle in  a multicultural 
academic environment, reading with the eyes of faith-faith in what we will be­
come and should envision-can perhaps become a more acceptable epistemol­
ogy. Such reading, in turn, has the potential to create writers and writings that 
begin to generate new canons of self and knowledge. 
Serious attention to literature as a guide to intellectual and moral develop­
ment is a belief-guided interpretive practice as old as the English and German 
Romantic concept of the bildungsroman-the novel as a paradigm of character 
development. The notion of l iterature as model and guide to the development of 
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identity is assuming renewed importance i n  a multicultural academy striving to 
define common grounds and values among its diverse constituencies. Although 
recent literary theory and aesthetics have often emphasized literature's strategic 
indeterminacy and status as beguiling fiction, it has also been approached in many 
times and places as a vehicle for making cultural and personal meanings by both 
readers and characters. Through their stories and through adult models all  cul­
tures present children with "canonical images of sel fhood" (Bruner, 1986, p. 130). 
In the first cl assrooms of modern Western democracies, l iterary study was de­
fined as an equalizing curriculum-a set of models of character and voice that 
would be shared by all students. 
In the classrooms of the first Western democracies literary study was de­
fined as an equalizing resource for the formation of self. Recuperating this model 
of l iterature as a model for identity can help extend the academic selves and 
voices we already propound to larger and increasingly diverse coll ege student 
constituencies. Approached as a source of images of self and as a representation 
of intellectual discourses, literature, and the talk about literature modeled by teach­
ers, becomes more than mere fiction, more than a trivial diversion or belletristic 
entertainment, and more than a ruthless exercise in cynically dismantling mean­
ing and authorial personality. Literature, and the teacher's modeling of talk about 
literature, can also assume the roles of supplements to identity, training grounds 
for thought, models for language, and sites for reviving belief. 
An ancient defense of belief working in accord with intellect posited that 
intel lectual activity is, and should be,  faith seeking understanding, belief 
creating a space conducive to thought and insight: credo ut intelligam. Such a 
model presents faith-in a higher being, or God-and be lief-in commonly held 
doctrines, concepts, and values-as working hand in hand with reason and the 
intellect. In the Prometheus and Faust legends it is faith-in the gods, in the 
shared, constructed, common values of tradition-that must temper the potential 
arrogance of unguided rationality and excessive anthropocentrism. 
We need not persist in treating faith as blind and belief as a primitive age of 
innocence-as stages in a developmental continuum in which true advancement 
is marked by the abandonment of belief and superstition, and the triumph of pure 
rational analytic thought. Compulsory skepticism; promoted as an end in itself, 
is perceived by many students as mystifying and repressive by many inside as 
well as outside the academy (Gates, 199 3;  Murphy, 1993; Phelps, 1 992).  Doctri­
naire skepticism shou l d  continue to be tempe red by the recuperation of 
belief-grounded learning based on coll ective social values. As this happens, the 
roles played by character, speaker, and author in literary study will be illumi­
nated by new lights and seen through new lenses. Reprisals of the relationships 
among belief, collective social values, and the many roles of character, speaker, 
and author that we find in literary representations can help in the process. Recent 
pedagogical applications of this defense of skepticism have been chall enged on 
the grounds that denying epistemological and social agency to groups who have 
long been marginalized is hardly an acceptable academic purpose (Gates, 1993 ;  
Murphy, 199 3 ;  Phelps, 1992). As writers, as readers, and as characters i n  recent 
literature, women and minorities seek to be more in the picture, more in the text, 
and more part of the discussion, not less so. 
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Alternative models of metacognitive and metalinguistic self-consciousness 
are often only implicit in cultures and literatures. Of the priestess's voice that 
speaks out of and to a collective culture, Christa Wolf 's (1984) Cassandra says, 
"We have no name for what spoke out of me" (p. l07). Western philosophy and 
language theory have made names for what speaks: explicit, mandatory vehicles 
of thought and instruction. The Western separated self is able to refer explicitly 
to my identity, my position, but it is becoming increasingly clear in cross-cultural 
studies of identity and intellect that this self is only one among a number of pos­
sible selves, voices, and self images. The proximal learning accomplished by 
identifying with models that has been observed in early childhood development 
is true of identifying with literary characters and with teachers as well. Classical 
rhetorics, in their own multicultural milieus, were well aware of this when they 
emphasized imitation and mimesis as primary vehicles for learning ways of think­
ing, ways of speaking, ways of reading, and ways of writing. Jerome Bruner (1 986) 
observes, "An Anlage of metac�gnition is present as early as the eighteenth month 
of life. How much and in what form it develops will depend upon the demands of 
the culture in which one lives-represented by particular others one encounters 
and by some notion of generalized other that one forms" (p. 67). Studies of proxi­
mal learning, identity formation, belief, and faith enhance a growing understand­
ing that selfhood and agency are best developed-by many individuals in many 
different cultures-from within the circles of community and belief, contexts that 
should never be forcibly removed. 
What uses can the academy make of these insights drawn from cross cultural 
studies of development? The academy has already begun to benefit from an 
expanded repertoire of models of selfhood, identity, and intellect as it becomes 
increasingly multicultural. However, an overly literal-minded, reductive 
panoply of canonical selves and identities- women , Black/African/African 
American, Asian, or, all lumped together, nontraditional-has already produced 
a fissured politics of identity that is troublingly conducive to a "self-esteem school 
of pedagogy, a view of education as a sort of twelve-step program for recovery" 
(Gates, 1992, p. 36). Edward Said ( 199 1) warns against the dangers of reductive 
essentialism along similar lines. "To say that women should read mainly women's 
literature, that Blacks should study and perfect only Black techniques of under­
standing and interpretation, that Arabs and Muslims should return to the Holy 
Book for all knowledge and wisdom is the inverse of saying along with Carlyle 
and Gobineau that all the lesser races must retain their inferior status in the world" 
(p. 17). Newly formed cultural identities that are being shaped within revised 
academic curricula have been defended primarily on the grounds that they pro­
mote belief in oneself, defined as self-esteem. This basis for curricular revision 
confuses the strong evidence that school achievement is causally related to self 
esteem with the paucity of evidence that self esteem is related to school achieve­
ment. "When Laotian students in California ace their exams it isn't because the 
curriculum reinforces a rich sense of their Laotian cultural heritage" (Gates, 1992, 
p. 36). The development of new curricula in writing and literature should be given 
goals in addition to self-esteem. Multicultural curricular reform needs no further 
defense, but it begs for orchestration. 
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Libretto for a New Canon 
Proponents of various writing pedagogies, critical thinking modeis, and 
literary critical theories have recently engaged in disputes concerning agency, 
epistemology, and the nature and value of controversy within the academy 
(Graff, 1990; Holmes, 1993; Marino, 1993). This is potentially refreshing and 
illuminating, a reminder that teaching the conflicts, after all,  is hardly a new 
idea. Observing contrasts, differences, and dialectical oppositions has long been 
a staple of Western academic practice, especially in the liberal arts and philoso­
phy. With this in mind, I invite a reconsideration of how the commonplaces of 
ancient rhetoric were regarded as  artificial but useful common grounds for 
d iscuss ing  and debating wi ld ly  d i sparate materia l s ,  i ssues ,  and bel iefs .  
Reappraising the rhetorical commonplaces of classical rhetoric included, how­
ever, not just difference and contrast, but similarity and comparison, not just 
dialectic understood as opposing propositions, but dialectic understood as dia­
logical truth seeking. The value of common places-in the larger cultural sense­
cannot be underestimated in today's  academy. The commonplaces of antiquity 
can help nurture this belief. They are ancient and were at their inception under­
stood as artificial;  they have already proven themselves in the long test of time, 
amid the constantly shifting cultures and languages of the academy. 
Humanistic education has since the time of the first rhetorical commonplaces 
been based on the belief that learning critical thought through skepticism and 
debate prepares individuals to prove, perfect, and defend their views and beliefs 
in an ongoing dialectical examination. John Henry Cardinal Newman's 19th 
century essay, "The Idea of a University" ( 1982), extended this concept for one 
of the first times in modern times to incorporate the reading of modern litera­
tures as part of a larger process of criticism directed at humanistic understanding 
throughout the university. Newman's  discussion is a welcome reminder that hu­
manistic study and education have been considered cultural criticism for well 
over a century. Criticism should be taught and learned, he proposes, through read­
ing literature as itself a criticism of culture. The canonical literary authors many 
would dispense with today-Dickens, Eliot, Twain,  Thoreau-were in  their own 
time political activists, critics outside the academy of the dominant culture that 
the academy in their day did not address. Newman and others defended the study 
of the literature of diverse cultures within the academy as a way of reinstating 
humanism's role as cultural criticism that would promote values-beliefs about 
what it is to be human-from within an academy that had become desiccated by 
other kinds of criticism, science, and philology. 
The political and ethical beliefs defended in Newman's "Idea of a Univer­
sity" c learly hearken back to his classical training but are adapted to modern 
goals. For a multicultural (as we say today) society to exist, both differences and 
commonalities among peoples must be recognized. Education should seek to 
re-comprehend the diversity of human cultures in order to promote a belief in 
tolerance and respect. And it should establish as a basic premise-a fundamental 
intellectual axiom and belief-that tolerance and respect are impossible without 
knowledge (Gates, 1992, p. 37). Said ( 1 99 1) defines this double purpose of the 
academy as a dialectic in which discovery is directed at transformation: "In the 
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joint discovery of self and other, it is the role of the academy to transform what 
might be conflict, or contest, or assertion into reconciliation, mutuality, recogni­
tion, creative interaction" (pp. 1 7- 1 8) .  These are noble, decidedly attractive, fa­
mili ar, and even pious goals. They are not, however, goals or activities that con­
form to today's paradigms of academic skepticism and programmatic doubt. On 
what basis can reconcil i ation , mutuality, recognition, and creative i n teraction be 
established as common ground in the midst of contemporary literary and episte­
mological theories that regard common ground and i ts pursuit as  politically out­
dated and ethically i ncorrect? The most recent movement in the academy, ob­
served by many with dismay, is a concerted movement, often under the aegis of 
multiculturalism and teaching the conflicts, toward balkanizing academic disci­
plines and cultures into smaller and smaller warring factions. 
I s  there room i n  the decidedly Western elite civic and academic tradition for 
both forging and discovering the common beliefs on which goals l i ke mutuali ty 
and creative interaction can be p.ursued? I hope we can begin to ask this question 
without apology. What does i t  mean to read with the eyes of faith-in this sense­
in the academy, and what can the academy teach the eyes of faith? Liberal arts 
humanism and a civic-minded academy have often manifested a certain tension 
between the roles of paragon and gadfly, exemplar and cultural critic, between 
the aspirations to teach creativity a nd originality and the responsibility to define 
standards of taste and correctness (White, 1 985). Similarly, the academy and 
culture alike have tolerated a commendable range of s tyles and goals among 
writers, artists, and critics, some of whom define themselves as makers and 
readers of literary art and others who define themselves as exponents of particu­
lar political agendas. I advocate the study and production of literary and critical 
wri ting that directly addre s s e s  social i ssues as well as  that which does not. 
However, current  practice seems to be a bit more polarized and doctrinaire. Some 
critical voices teach partisan political commentary; i n  other quarters critical and 
theoretical equivocation has led some of the best and brightest critical minds to 
retreat from commitment to specific positions, and to refrain from morally based 
action o n  theoretical grounds . "It is as if someone in a position of power were to 
issue a policy statement focusing solely on the difficulties of arriving at a policy 
or to decline doing anything because any action, might, in certain instances,  be 
doctrinaire" (Torgovnick, 1 993, p. 54). 
Where Marxist cultural critics such as Gerald Graff have erred in confusing 
the description of partisan, reductive, and polarized academic theories with teach­
ing to theorize (Phelps, 1 992), cautious deconstructionists such as Geoffre y  
Hartman ( 1 99 1 )  err with similar effect b y  creating a false dichotomy between 
deconstruction and political or engaged criticism, as if to say that these two very 
different activities cannot occupy the same academic space. Graff's ( 1 990) prac­
tice exemplifies what Hartman ( 1 99 1 )  thinks of as theoretical fundamentalism. 
I have proposed that a larger, dialectical relationship can be resuscitated 
to help redefine such opposi tions, a double vision of their nature and value. 
One less reductive, less polarized alternative resides in the model of the mind as 
spirit, and of belief as the result of reasoned conviction (Kinneavy, 1 987). Belief 
and faith -sustaining practices o f  knowing, learn ing,  and teaching provide 
antidotes to overly psychologized notions of writing and textual interpretation 
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a s  inevitably fragmentary, eternally incomplete, merely personal, and exclusively 
therapeutic. Intellectual practices guided by belief, for exampl e, enhance the 
abil ity to c omprehend diversity as a unity, just as the quest for difference 
inevitably succeeds. The most dispassionate analysis, Kierkegaard and for that 
matter Plato long ago recognized, is in the end always directed by interests and 
purposes, passions and beliefs. Kierkegaard's deliberately personal forms of 
philosophizing (Mackey, 197 1) were designed to provide instructive, edifying 
examples of philosophy as comprising multiple genres and fostering tolerance 
for many varieties of self while still retaining a common language and common 
goals. One of his titles, Either/Or, emphasizes that we choose to believe, in 
different situations and with different purposes, in the disjunctive either or the 
potentially less divisive conjunction, or. 
Skepticism, criticism, and debate, regardless of the value that is assigned 
them by their diverse reformers and adversaries, remain distinctly Western. 
Definitive of academic discourse, these modes of knowing and speaking evolved 
from agonistic male-to-male rhetorical traditions within the academy and on the 
platforms of public political debate (Ong, 1992; Wills, 1990). It is increasingly 
clear that debate in this liberal and humane tradition has been sanctioned 
primarily for and by those in positions of power (Holmes, 1993). Women and 
minorities have until recently not been permitted to dispute, to debate, or even 
to speak on the public platform. Oddly enough, through similar rules of 
enfranchisement,  particular l y  in the U . S. where church and state are so 
rigorously segregated, religion has often been excluded from public debate 
and indeed has been cast as the enemy and not as the ally of education, liberal 
humanism, and the pursuit of know l e dge (Carter, 1 99 3 ;  Hol mes,  199 3 ;  
Wills, 1990). 
It is a great irony that the denunciation of secular humanism currently 
propounded by the religious right necessarily appeals to the larger humanist value 
of open public debate. The irony is only compounded by a doctrinaire denuncia­
tion of any and all religion in the public place by academicians who want their 
doctrines of culture, society, and identity to receive equal time not only in the 
academy but in the public sphere as well . The conventions-the values and the 
beliefs-that govern the public presence and power of alternative voices is slowly 
changing. Let us continue to broaden the bases of tolerance and understanding 
for the many kinds of voices that are now seeking to sing together, to forge com­
mon values out of newly discovered common beliefs, and together make just a 
few simple leaps of faith. c<2J 
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